The EU and border management in the Western Balkans: preparing for European integration or safeguarding EU external borders? by Collantes-Celador, G. & Juncos, A. E.
Collantes-Celador, G. & Juncos, A. E. (2012). The EU and border management in the Western 
Balkans: preparing for European integration or safeguarding EU external borders?. Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies, 12(2), pp. 201-220. doi: 10.1080/14683857.2012.686250 
City Research Online
Original citation: Collantes-Celador, G. & Juncos, A. E. (2012). The EU and border management 
in the Western Balkans: preparing for European integration or safeguarding EU external borders?. 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12(2), pp. 201-220. doi: 
10.1080/14683857.2012.686250 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13880/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Published in the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12(2), 2012, pp. 201-220. 
 
 1 
The EU and Border Management in the Western Balkans: Preparing for European 
Integration or Safeguarding EU External Borders?  
 
Gemma Collantes-Celador (City University London) 
 
 and  
 
Ana E. Juncos (University of Bristol) 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article evaluates the European Union (EU)’s border strategy for the Western Balkans. 
It identifies an increasing tension between, on the one hand, the Union’s use of its border 
strategy to foster the long-term stabilisation of the countries of the Western Balkans and 
their future integration into the EU and, on the other hand, the use of border management 
as an instrument to ensure its own internal security. This tension can be broken down into 
a three-fold contradiction inbuilt into the EU’s strategy: short-term vs. long-term objectives; 
a security vs. development focus; and interventionism vs. local ownership approaches. 
These contradictions, aggravated by local and regional political, economic and security 
challenges, can explain existing shortcomings in the EU’s border interventions in the 
Western Balkans.  
 
 
Keywords: integrated border management, European Union, Western Balkans, 
effectiveness, coordination, local ownership. 
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Introduction  
Border management is often defined as the administration of borders by a 
‘professionally trained security apparatus with responsibilities, powers, functional 
mandates and a professional identity separate and distinct from other security providing 
structures’ (Marenin 2006, 17). The rules, techniques and procedures within any border 
security system vary depending on the national and regional context, the organisational 
dynamics, and the multiple ‘rationalities’ under consideration (Hills 2006a, 2006b). In 
war-torn societies, poorly governed and weak states, border management responds to a 
peacebuilding and developmental rationality. Borders perform a crime-fighting and a 
trade function but are also part of building the international personality and territorial 
integrity of societies. Increasingly, border management also serves an internal security 
rationality whereby the international community uses border management as a strategy to 
protect Western populations from the consequences of the ‘regressive developmental 
malaise’ (Carnegie Commission cited in Duffield 2003, 307). That is, non-conventional 
and transnational forms of crime (including illegal flows of people, goods, capital and 
services) that flourish on the basis of local and regional socio-economic, political and 
environmental insecurities, and the privatisation of conflict. The ‘War on Terror’ has 
added impetus to the use of border management as a foreign tool to obtain domestic 
security due to the increasing association that can be found in many policy circles between 
terrorist networks and organised crime activities (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011, 
416-419).   
This article seeks to contribute to an understanding of the role that border 
management plays in international interventions in third states. More concretely, the 
article evaluates the border strategy followed by the European Union (EU) in the Western 
Balkans. This strategy provides a good illustration of the internal security rationality 
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outlined above. On the one hand, it responds to the cross-border effects the ongoing 
political and socio-economic instability of the region is having on its long-term 
stabilisation. On the other hand, it is also motivated by the EU’s internal security needs, 
which explains why border management is at the heart of the external dimension of the 
Union’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The argument developed here sheds light on the 
fact that, inbuilt into the EU’s strategy, there is a three-fold contradiction: (1) between its 
short-term approach to border management and the long-term nature of the challenges 
facing the region; (2) between its own security needs and the national and regional socio-
economic needs in the Western Balkans; and (3) between the temptation to intervene from 
the outside to impose quick fix solutions and the need to promote local ownership and 
sustainability of the reforms. The tensions arising from these contradictions are aggravated 
by the political, economic and security problems that have affected the region at least from 
the wars of the 1990s to date, inter alia, problems of corruption and organised crime, 
political instability (and thus, legitimacy, credibility and fragile statebuilding and 
democratisation processes); a difficult economic situation, and a weak absorption 
capacity.  
This article starts first with a discussion of the dual logic guiding the EU’s strategy 
in the Western Balkans, which has sought to promote its model of border management as 
a first step in the process of integrating these countries into the EU and as a way to defend 
the EU populations from external security threats. Second, the article moves onto 
examining the EU’s Integrated Border Management Strategy (IBM) and its 
implementation in the Western Balkans. The article then evaluates the results so far 
achieved by this strategy, using coordination and effectiveness as key assessment 
variables. The aim here is not to quantify levels of coordination and effectiveness but 
rather to use these to map the challenges arising from the three-fold contradiction outlined 
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above. This article will draw primarily from the case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(hereafter referred to as Bosnia) and Kosovo with a particular emphasis on their border 
police agencies.1  
 
Securing the Borders or Integrating the Western Balkans? 
In the EU context, border management has been defined as ‘activities carried out 
at a border, in response exclusively to an intention to cross a border, and consisting of 
border checks and border surveillance’ (European Union 2009, 3; see also Hills 2006b, 
42). The former refers to checks at border control points, while the latter concerns the 
monitoring of the blue and green borders, land and water border zones between two 
control points. The concept of border management has various dimensions (security, 
trade/business, foreign policy), something that Hobbing (2005, 3) explains by noting the 
evolution of the concept of ‘effective’ and ‘integrated’ border management, and Georgiev 
relates to the instrumental use of the border strategy for other EU policies (2010, 255). 
However, the security component remains central in the EU’s border strategy, with some 
authors pointing out that other objectives associated with the internal European space − 
such as justice, freedom and development − are if necessary subordinated to that of 
security (Balzacq and Carrera 2006; Corrado 2006; Monar 2010). This assumption 
underpins the analysis of the EU border strategy in the Western Balkans developed in the 
rest of the article.    
While the importance of internal borders in the EU has gradually decreased by the 
creation of the internal market and the implementation of the Schengen Agreement, a 
simultaneous process of hardening of its external borders has taken place in order to create 
what Monar (2007, 54) has described as an ‘external shield for EU internal security’ or 
what Georgiev (2010, 256) frames as a response to the ‘security deficit’ emanating from 
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the internal abolition of borders. But this process has not ended at the EU’s borders. As 
part of the external dimension of JHA the EU has also attempted to project its model of 
border management beyond its external rims in an effort to create a ‘buffer zone’ to protect 
itself from ‘unwanted’ threats such as illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism 
(Wolff 2008). Hence the EU has engaged in a form of ‘remote policing’ defined as ‘remote 
control policies, whereby agents of social control attempt to maintain the security of 
Western populations by establishing checkpoints and control stations in defined zones of 
disorder far away from their home territory’ (Bigo quoted in Gatev 2008, 103). The EU 
has therefore been involved in twinning exercises and 
rebuilding/transforming/strengthening the capacity of the border services in neighbouring 
countries as well as intensifying its cooperation with other Western agencies. 
Underpinning this understanding of the EU’s border strategy is the conviction that security 
is relational and thus, the Union’s internal security will be increased by improvements in 
border standards and the stability, more generally, of origin and transit countries (Balzacq 
2009; Corrado 2006).   
Conditionality has become one of the key mechanisms to externalise the EU’s JHA 
strategy. An efficient border security service is considered a crucial requirement for those 
countries that want to join the EU family. The Schengen rules have been incorporated into 
the acquis communautaire and have thus become a condition for candidate countries (Rees 
2008). In the case of the Western Balkan countries, border management requirements have 
been included in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements and are monitored in the 
Commission’s annual reports. The border requirements associated with the membership 
accession process for the Western Balkans are nevertheless in direct confrontation with 
the ongoing perception of countries in the region as either themselves a source of security 
concerns for the Union or the ‘last line of defence’ against external threats.2 The visa 
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liberalisation process in the region, as explained below, is a case in point particularly if 
we note, as Flessenkemper and Bütow (2011, 165) have done, that the conditions Western 
Balkan countries have been expected to meet were greater than for others in the Schengen 
white-list. They relate this situation to geographical explanations (the Western Balkans 
are surrounded by EU member states) and perceptions of the region in the ‘old EU’ as 
paternalistic, heavily influenced by discourses of criminality and corruption and ‘a 
perception that violence and backwardness are an indelible part of the Balkans’ 
(Flessenkemper and Bütow 2011, 168).  According to an EU official,  
 
There is this kind of dual discourse. On the one hand, [the EU says:] ‘you will be part 
of the family and we will make things easier for you and that is why you have to 
implement the Schengen acquis because one day you will be one of us’. On the other 
hand, […] with border management, the EU is telling them [the Western Balkan 
countries] you are a potential danger and we still see the security implications 
(personal interview by author, Brussels, 4 July 2007).  
 
The inherent tension within EU border strategies in the Western Balkans is not an 
isolated phenomenon, but as pointed out by Berg and Ehin (2006, 53-71), it would appear 
as a characteristic feature of the EU border regime as a whole. They identify three policy 
paradigms at work in the EU border policy: the EU Regional Policy (promoting cohesion 
and cross-border cooperation); the Schengen provisions in JHA (emphasizing security); 
and another policy paradigm guiding enlargement and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, which puts the accent on the fluidity and mobility of borders. Each of these policy 
paradigms has a different mode of governance, attributes different functions to the border 
regime and supports different degrees of openness. According to Berg and Ehin (2006, 
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54), ‘the result of this vertically and horizontally fragmented policy process is a border 
strategy characterised by internal contradictions and a lack of coherence’.  
In line with this conclusion, this article highlights three key contradictions at play 
in the EU’s border strategy for the Western Balkans. First, there has been a tendency to 
focus on short-term challenges rather than dealing with the long-term structural problems 
(often of a socio-economic nature) that are frequently at the heart of the security 
challenges in the region. This ‘shortermism’, characteristic of many of the efforts of the 
international community in the Western Balkans more generally (Belloni 2007), has 
resulted in dysfunctional responses, aggravated by the fragmentation and lack of 
coordination of the international presence in the region. Having said that, some differences 
can be found in the strategies of different EU institutions and instruments, with Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instruments more focused on short-term (crisis 
management) responses and Commission instruments more prone to dealing with long-
term issues. As mentioned before, there is also a tension between the EU’s own security 
needs and the national and regional socio-economic needs in the Western Balkans. Ryan 
(2009) has referred to this as the ‘security-first approach to socio-economic development’. 
In the cases of Albania and Montenegro, he notes that EU security sector reforms reveal 
a tension between ‘a more holistic approach and a security-based approach that is top-
down and largely founded on the self-referential security concerns of the European Union’ 
(Ryan 2009, 311). Linked to the top-down nature of the EU’s intervention in the region is 
the final tension, between the temptation to intervene from the outside to impose quick fix 
solutions and the need to promote local ownership and sustainability of the reforms. 
Before examining how these tensions have materialised in the cases of Bosnia and 
Kosovo, it is worth looking at the initiatives the EU has launched in the area of border 
management in the Western Balkans.  
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The EU and the Management of Borders in the Western Balkans 
The EU’s strategy in the Western Balkans is based on the concept of Integrated 
Border Management (IBM) which has become a prerequisite for accession to the EU. This 
strategy pursues the creation of open and secure borders. Effective border management 
should facilitate free movement of goods and people, but at the same time, prevent 
unlawful activities (Hobbing 2005, 3). The main elements of the IBM strategy include: 
(1) a comprehensive approach that goes beyond the physical security of borders to deal 
with issues of trade, transport, health and safety, etc.; (2) the need for inter-agency 
cooperation, inter alia, customs, border police and veterinary services; (3) regional and 
international cooperation as essential components to achieve effective border security; and 
(4) the  development of appropriate professional skills, which requires a move from 
military border control to specialised police forces (Hobbing 2005, 2). The Schengen 
Catalogue is considered the guiding criteria for external border control (Council of the EU 
2002).  
To support implementation of the IBM concept, in 2004 the Commission produced 
some Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans (European 
Union 2007). These guidelines focus on three aspects: intra-service cooperation, inter-
agency cooperation and international cooperation. The first one refers to efficient vertical 
and horizontal cooperation within a specific agency. The second one, as mentioned earlier, 
concerns cooperation between the different national services involved in border 
management in order to ensure day-to-day communication and consistency among 
different activities. The final aspect seeks to ensure cooperation among different regional 
and international actors at a bilateral and multilateral level.  
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Until its termination in 2006, the CARDS programme financed Commission and 
member states projects in this area.3 Its successor, the Instrument for Pre-Accession, also 
covers assistance for border management. In operational terms, the EU has deployed a 
broad range of instruments, from twinning programmes and other technical assistance 
provided on the ground by the Commission/EU Delegations to expert advice by the police 
and rule of law missions launched under the umbrella of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) in Macedonia/fYROM, Bosnia and Kosovo. The EU has also 
deployed an EU Monitoring Mission and two military operations (Concordia in 
Macedonia/fYROM and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia) that played a role in monitoring the 
security situation, and exceptionally, in the case of EUFOR, provided assistance to the 
local authorities when they have lacked the appropriate capacities. EUROPOL (European 
Police Office) has offered advice in the areas of organised crime and counter-terrorism 
and supported bilateral intelligence exchanges. FRONTEX, the European agency that 
coordinates operational cooperation between the member states in the management of 
external borders, has also concluded working arrangements with Western Balkan 
countries with similar objectives (FRONTEX 2012). These different activities reflect the 
complex nature of border management that requires a comprehensive range of 
instruments.  
The EU has also cooperated with other international actors in multilateral projects. 
For instance, in 2002, following the crisis in Macedonia/fYROM, NATO launched an 
initiative aimed at promoting stability and security in the region with a particular focus on 
border security issues. The idea was – in the words of an EU official − to support ‘if not 
EU, at least Euro-Atlantic objectives of border policing, and one of these is the civilian 
control of border management’ (personal interview by author, Brussels, 4 July 2007) – i.e. 
the de-militarization of borders. The initiative crystallised in what was known as the Ohrid 
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Process (2003-2008). Under the umbrella of the Stability Pact, and bringing together the 
three major organisations operating in the region (the EU, NATO and OSCE) and the then 
five countries of the Western Balkans (Macedonia/fYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Bosnia, Croatia and Albania), the Ohrid Process sought to coordinate activities among the 
international organisations involved, foster regional cooperation and promote the adoption 
of European standards on integrated border management (Stability Pact 2003). However, 
the security dimension was very much present in the minds of these organisations. As an 
EU official put it, ‘you will see that the word “security” is put before “management” in 
the title of the process, and NATO insisted on this. So we emphasise this link [between 
borders and security], but this is a political process that focuses on the capabilities of the 
countries to manage their borders’ (personal interview by author, Brussels, 4 July 2007). 
 The following analysis of the coordination and effectiveness of EU activities in the 
region will provide additional illustrations of the implementation of the abovementioned 
initiatives, with a particular focus both on the inherent tensions in the EU’s strategy and 
the impact of local political imperatives and socio-economic realities.  
 
EU Border Management Activities: Coordination 
As in other security sectors, fragmentation characterises international intervention 
in border management in the Western Balkans. The EU is a relatively newcomer to this 
sector when compared to other international organisations active in the region since the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, namely the UN, NATO and the OSCE. A multitude of other 
international actors have also contributed to border management, including the Stability 
Pact/Regional Cooperation Council, UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and 
UNDP (UN Development Programme) and bilateral donors such as the US, UK, 
Netherlands and Germany, among others.4 Against this rich background of donor 
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contributions to border management, coordination has inevitably faced a number of 
problems. Among them is the fact that ‘[t]hese actors are driven by their own interests and 
priorities, which are sometimes in conflict with EU conceptions of IBM’ (Marenin 2010, 
118). A case in point is the international support to IT and communications systems for 
the Kosovo Border police. Support has come from donations from different donors and 
this has resulted in a ‘piece by piece’ approach (EULEX 2009, 80). Two overlapping IT 
systems have been used in Kosovo’s border crossing points. One funded by the 
Commission and another one based on donations by the US and supported by ICITAP 
(International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme), the so-called 
PISCES system (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System). 
However, the latter does not fulfil Schengen requirements (EULEX 2009, 80) and is being 
replaced by the new EU-funded version in all border crossing points at the time of writing 
(April 2012). This illustrates how a problem of coordination among international donors 
can have serious operational implications for the nascent border institution.   
While problems of coherence have impinged upon the efforts of every 
international organisation and country involved in border management, internal coherence 
in the case of the EU represents a specific challenge. Different reasons explain this: the 
pillar division introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992),5 the complexity of procedures, 
and the number of actors involved both in the decision-making and the implementation 
process. First, the traditional cross-pillar nature of border management raised significant 
challenges. Until the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, no genuine ‘cross-pillar’ mechanisms 
to implement border management activities were in place, with the exception of the 
double-hatted EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Macedonia/fYROM (also acting as 
the Head of the Commission Delegation). This arrangement contributed to a more unified 
approach to security sector reform in general and border management in particular, but it 
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was the exception rather than the rule. The establishment of the position of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy held by Catherine Ashton and an 
External Action Service were intended to ensure coherence at the Brussels level, but it is 
unclear how they might improve operational coordination between CSDP missions and 
other EU border management initiatives. Moreover, notwithstanding the positive changes 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty, it remains a matter of debate to what extent this treaty and 
the subsequent Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) will promote the external dimension 
of JHA (Trauner and Carrapiço 2012, 8-11; Monar 2010). For example, the fundamental 
question of where overall responsibility for border management lays, remains unsolved. 
As stated by Marenin (2010, 116), border management crosses over into ‘three policy 
domains: community, member states and a common foreign policy’ and reflects the 
‘reality that only limited agreement exists on who has authority over what policy’. The re-
labelled EU Delegations, which have taken the role of the rotating Presidency in the 
country, should however help coordinate Commission and Council initiatives. 
EU activities in Bosnia give an idea of the challenges in this area. Until 2011, the 
Commission Delegation had its own programmes supporting the implementation of the 
IBM strategy, through economic assistance and twinning programmes (personal 
interviews by author, Sarajevo, 17 September 2009 and 17 September 2010). For its part, 
the EUSR played an important political role in ‘persuading’ the local authorities to carry 
out reforms in the area of policing and rule of law, including border management. In 2011, 
the positions of Head of the EU Delegation and EUSR were merged, which should 
facilitate coordination in this policy area. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) has also helped 
strengthening the BiH Border Police, while the EU military force (EUFOR) deployed 
several operations to support local efforts in the fight against organised crime, including 
border patrolling, during the first two years of its mandate (December 2004-2006). Other 
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EU bodies such as FRONTEX and EUROPOL are involved in security sector reform 
activities in the areas of intelligence reform and the fight against organised crime. 
In addition to the multiplicity of actors and the institutional fragmentation 
mentioned above, shortcomings in coordination within the EU reflect deeper problems in 
its overall strategy towards the Western Balkans. EU activities in the area of border 
management reveal a tension between short-term and long-term objectives, security and 
developmental focuses, and interventionism and ‘local ownership’ approaches. These 
tensions translate not only into different institutional responses but within institutions, into 
mismatches between overall objectives and actions on the ground.  
On the one hand, Community activities have been more aware of the need to 
promote a holistic and long term approach. The Commission has also emphasised the 
importance of ownership of the reforms, although, as will be discussed in the following 
section, often its activities still fall short in this area. The Commission’s Security Sector 
Reform Concept (2006, 3) acknowledges that ‘Security Sector Reform should be seen as 
a holistic process, strengthening security for all citizens as well as addressing governance 
deficits […] Although some aspects of Security Sector Reform can be short-term, the 
overall Security Sector Reform process needs to be long-term and be based on strong 
national ownership’. Yet, in practice, in spite of the Commission’s discourse, often 
Community assistance to border management has aimed at supporting infrastructure and 
institution-building projects, while the more developmental aspects, including 
democratisation and human rights issues, and the deep socio-economic roots of the 
problem, have not been adequately prioritised in Commission border management 
projects.6 For instance, CARDS assistance to border management in Macedonia/fYROM 
during the period 2000-2004 focused on the provision of operational equipment to the 
Police and Customs Administration, the development of a National IBM Strategy and 
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other legislative and institutional elements such as the creation of an Inter-ministerial 
Commission for Border Management and a National Border Management Co-ordination 
Centre (European Agency for Reconstruction 2007).  
On the other hand, CFSP actors have usually concentrated on security aspects and 
short term activities. According to Sheriff (2007, 88), ‘Security Sector Reform actions 
driven by the EU crisis management agenda alone run the risk of downplaying norms that 
require a longer-term development perspective consistent with human rights, democratic 
oversight, good governance, accountability and transparency’. While these different EU 
approaches are justified in specific circumstances – e.g. CSDP  missions are allegedly 
launched in ‘crisis’ scenarios with a short-term and security focus – the various 
institutional realities have not always been adequately coordinated, both at planning and 
implementation stages.  
One of the main problems affecting EU activities in the area of border management 
refers to the coordination between the different civilian agencies, including member 
states’ activities, deployed in the field. Commission programmes and member states 
bilateral activities have concentrated on improving border management in accordance 
with the objectives of IBM, with a focus on institution-building (infrastructure, legislation, 
twinning programmes). For their part, interventions by the EU police/rule of law missions 
deployed in the region have focused on short-term capacity building and training. This 
division of labour is in theory a positive asset to ensure no duplication takes place. The 
problem is that in practice activities have usually been deployed separately and 
coordination among all these civilian actors has often only happened in an ad hoc way and 
a posteriori (i.e. once all the actors where deployed on the ground), leading to limited 
synergies between and among different projects.  
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 At times coordination of civilian actors has been difficult simply because of the 
sheer number of actors involved (see Marenin 2010, 74). For example in the case of 
Bosnia, the EU’s intervention in the area of border management dates back to the UN 
period with the launching of the so-called IMMPACT project. Experts from Denmark, 
Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, the UK and Ireland were posted to provide the BiH 
Border Police (at the time known as the State Border Service, and then as State Border 
Police) with expertise on interviewing techniques, forgery detection and profiling.7 In 
addition, the European Commission, Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK 
were involved, in some cases quite heavily, in the development of this institution during 
the UN phase, through bilateral assistance, donations and training programmes. It also 
received great assistance from the German government who saw border control in Bosnia 
as a top priority. With the deployment of EUPM in 2003, bilateral projects conducted by 
EU member states and Commission’s projects through its CARDS programme continued, 
albeit not always in a coordinated fashion. However, the fact that Germany remained the 
main actor involved in the implementation of this project undoubtedly helped facilitate a 
smooth transition from the UN to the EU period and maintain policy consistency. A 70-
strong EUPM team of co-locators, mostly German and commonly known as the ‘State 
Border Service’s godfathers’, were deployed to mentor border officers. They were backed 
by bilateral assistance on funds and equipment (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 71). 
The intensive involvement in these border activities of EU member states, in addition to 
EU institutions, does not constitute a problem in itself. The main challenge relates – to go 
back to a point made earlier on − to the fact that each of them has tended to have its own 
interest and its own model of border management, despite the existence of IBM guidelines 
at the EU level.  
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Coordination of these activities in Kosovo was even more complicated because of 
the existence until December 2008 of another major EU actor in charge of managing EU 
projects: the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). The projects managed by the 
EAR focused mainly on the construction or renovation of border police stations, provision 
of equipment (computers, vehicles, etc.) and training (European Agency for 
Reconstruction 2007).With the disbandment of the EAR, its projects were handed over to 
the European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo. The Commission has also funded 
studies to assess Kosovo’s needs in order to develop and implement an IBM strategy. The 
EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) deals with customs and has some executive 
competencies in the fight against corruption and organised crime, key areas for the 
Union’s internal security needs (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011, 432-437). 
Coordination with the European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo has run smoothly 
so far (Grevi 2009, 365), for example, concerning the monitoring of the implementation 
of an Intelligence-Led Policing programme (EULEX 2010, 8).  
Coordination between military and civilian operations can however become a more 
challenging task. The emphasis of military crisis management operations on an executive 
and security approach to border management could lead (and has led) to tensions between 
CSDP military operations and other civilian actors, including police/rule of law missions 
and Community activities. These tensions were experienced in Bosnia after the 
deployment of EUFOR Althea in December 2004. EUPM (police) and EUFOR (military) 
encountered operational difficulties in coordinating their activities due to their conflicting 
outlooks on how to combat cross-border organised crime. For Muehlmann (2008, 399-
409) this was expected but not inevitable; expected, due to differences in culture and 
philosophy, and organisational structures, but not inevitable given the role played by the 
‘human factor’, or the impact that the decisions taken by the leadership of these two 
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missions had on generating or perpetuating the operational difficulties faced on the 
ground. EUPM chose the path of capacity-building due to its non-executive mandate and 
its belief on building local ownership, whereas EUFOR preferred a more ‘pro-active’ 
engagement (e.g. operations against illegal logging) due – at least partly – to what in its 
view was a weak border police that lacked the resourcefulness to act on its own when 
confronted with organised crime rings. The tensions on the ground were only resolved 
when Brussels and the EUSR in Bosnia put pressure on the two missions to agree on what 
came to be known as the Seven Principles for Coordination (personal interviews by 
author, Sarajevo, 2005-06).  
In the case of Kosovo, informal agreements for operational cooperation between 
the NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo Force) operation and EULEX were negotiated in 2007-
2008. However, Turkey blocked the adoption of four technical arrangements on 
cooperation between the two organisations until late 2008. The EULEX-NATO 
arrangements related to ‘response to civil disturbance situations, military support to police 
operations (including protection of patrimonial sites) and exchange of information 
(including in the field of intelligence)’ (Spernbauer 2010, 32), and have helped smooth 
cooperation between the two missions. In the area of border management, KFOR has 
gradually handed over the responsibilities for the surveillance of the green border to the 
Kosovo Border Police as the Mission is downsized. In April 2010, KFOR transferred the 
responsibility for the green border with Albania and joint patrols between KFOR, Kosovo 
Border Police and EULEX were established (EULEX 2010, 8). Responsibility for the 
surveillance of the border with Macedonia/fYROM and Montenegro was transferred in 
2011 (European Commission 2011b, 52). 
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EU Border Management Activities: Effectiveness 
Evaluating the implementation of the EU’s border management strategy in the 
Western Balkans necessarily requires touching on a number of issues that go beyond the 
coordination challenge and that can be grouped under two sub-headings: EU-related 
explanations and contextual conditions.   
 
EU-related Explanations 
The main factor to consider when analysing the effectiveness of efforts to develop 
functional border agencies in the region is the agenda guiding the EU, which can be at 
odds with the needs on the ground (Woodward 2003, 276-302; Ioannides and Collantes-
Celador 2011, 425-437). This situation is clearly illustrated by the Union’s visa regime 
vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, driven to a large extent by political and security 
imperatives resulting from the wars of the 1990s rather than by socio-
economic/developmental/trade concerns (see Flessenkemper and Bütow 2011).8 
Beginning in 2008, the visa liberalisation dialogue between the EU and the Western 
Balkans has been based on meeting ‘stringent, non-negotiable conditions’ (Flessenkemper 
and Bütow 2011, 165) in four  ‘blocks’, of which only one went beyond security matters: 
(1) document security; (2) border control/management, migration and asylum (including 
re-admission agreements for the repatriation of illegal immigrants to countries of origin); 
(3) public order and security (including the fight against organised crime, corruption and 
terrorism), and (4) external relations and fundamental rights. As explained by an EU 
official, the first three security-driven ‘blocks’ were more important for Schengen 
countries when assessing Bosnia’s progress in the visa liberalisation process (personal 
interview by author, Sarajevo, 16 September 2010).9  
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This ‘security-first approach’ – to use Ryan’s terminology (2009) – could explain 
the tendency to ‘securitize’ the management of borders. That is, the propensity to prioritise 
tactical short-term objectives (capacity-building, investment on resources and personnel) 
in the fields of counter-terrorism, the fight against organised crime and corruption, and 
the maintenance of order in society, over long-term needs in the governance side of border 
agencies (accountability, legitimacy, transparency). This ‘shortermism’ has in occasions 
led to the ‘export’ rather than ‘adaptation’ of external security models, for the sake of 
expediency but at the expense of local ownership and sustainability (as explained below). 
It could also mean that the long term socio-economic and political roots of problems in 
the region are often either missed or put to the side, undermining the overall effectiveness 
of the EU’s border strategy even when adopting the narrow security approach. This is 
despite the fact that polls routinely show that the main concerns among local populations 
are not security issues, but have to do with socio-economic problems. For instance, the 
UNDP 2009 Early Warning Report for Kosovo (2009, 4) shows that for a large part of the 
population the paramount problem is unemployment (46 per cent), followed by poverty 
(18 per cent) and lack of electricity supply (9 per cent) (see also Ioannides and Collantes-
Celador 2011: 434-437). Data collected in June 2010 by EUPM shows that public opinion 
in Bosnia rates unemployment first (62.3 per cent) followed by crime (46.7 per cent) and 
very close after that the economic situation (39.8 per cent).10 As put by a Bosnian official 
from the Directorate for European Integration,  
 
The EU sees this region mostly as a political and security issue [...] They have to 
change their focus […] The disparity in economic development and the lack of real 
convergence between Bosnia and the rest of Europe, that is the real threat to stability 
in the region (personal interview by author, Sarajevo, 10 June 2005).  
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In other instances, problems of effectiveness have directly resulted from the poor 
implementation of reforms by the international donors themselves. Examples abound, 
ranging from criticisms over the German influence on the design of the BiH Border 
Police,11 to the mixed performance by UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo) Border Police and KFOR in assisting in Kosovo’s fight against cross-border 
smuggling through the Administrative Boundary Line with Serbia prior to its 
independence in February 2008. The latter did in turn affect negatively the (perceived) 
impartiality and professionalism of the Kosovo Border Police among ethnic minorities at 
a time when it was developing its investigative capacities, infrastructure and 
communication systems. As summarised by a Commission official,  
 
UNMIK’s poor management of the Administrative Boundary Line [was] a serious 
problem that, if not addressed, [would have] most likely result[ed] in Kosovo 
becoming permanently established as a centre for black market activity of such 
significance as to prove economically destabilising for the region (personal interview 
by author, Brussels, 4 July 2007). 
 
Last, but not least, local ownership has not always been a top priority at the time of 
designing and implementing border management reforms, despite rhetorically receiving 
much attention. This gap has led to a problem of sustainability, both financial and 
operational. Let us examine the example of Bosnia. The 2010 annual report by the BiH 
Border Police reveals a 15 per cent decrease in the number of illegal crossings and a 28 
per cent decrease in the number of registered offences (EUPM 2011, 11). The Commission 
2011 Progress Report on Bosnia links this progress to the increase in joint patrols with 
counterparts in neighbouring countries, on the basis of agreements for border management 
cooperation, even if outstanding border demarcation or delimitation issues with Croatia, 
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Montenegro and Serbia remain unsolved. Progress has also been made in completing the 
adoption of the IBM-related legal framework and protocols of cooperation with other 
IBM-relevant Bosnian institutions were signed in April 2012 (European Commission 
2011a, 22-23, 53; EUPM 2012; personal interview by author, Sarajevo, 17 September 
2010). Notwithstanding these positive developments, the financial and in some ways 
operational sustainability of the border police in Bosnia remains a matter of debate. This 
border agency has been for much of its existence (over 11 years by April 2012) costly to 
maintain due to the initially higher salaries of its officers (compared with other police 
agencies in the country), state of the art equipment and specialised training. For some 
experts the introduction of the EU’s IBM system is part of the problem. For example, the 
EU invested €34.5 million in the reconstruction of Bosnia’s six priority crossing points 
(EUPM 2010, 5). As put by a EUPM official working on border issues, the IBM system 
is ‘ambitious in content for some areas [and] certainly in the timescale [but] there is no 
money [in Bosnia]’ (personal interview by author, Sarajevo, 15 September 2009). 
Moreover, as pointed out by a Bosnian official in the Ministry of Security, with Bosnia 
forced to respond to the effects of the global recession, it becomes more of a challenge to 
maintain the 89 border crossing points in the country (personal interview by author, 
Sarajevo, 22 September 2010). One can therefore conclude that the sustainability of the 
BiH Border Police system as it has been designed to operate depends – to an important 
extent – on the availability of funds. Plans to reduce the salaries of border police by five 
per cent under the 2012 state budget as part of a wider annual reduction of €20 million in 
the cost of public servants are a telling example of the country’s economic difficulties 
(Jukic 2012). The question as put by an EU official is whether the freezing and/or lowering 
of salaries that has in fact been taking place at least since 2009 will lead to an increase in 
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corruption within the border police (personal interview by author, Sarajevo, September 
2009).  
In line with the IBM strategy border crossings in Bosnia are designed to meet best 
Schengen standards but are then not adequately used by the BiH Border Police because of 
lower volumes of traffic compared with Schengen countries, a persistent lack of skills in 
basic areas (e.g.  interviewing, data gathering and analysis, etc.),12 shortages of certain 
types of equipments (e.g. night vision devices, sensors, etc.) and recruitment levels. The 
number of unfilled positions, most of which are for police officers, represented in 2010 
nine per cent of the overall personnel strength of this institution (at 2,536 employees) 
(personal interviews by author, Sarajevo, 2009-2010; OHR Press Office 2010; EUPM 
2011, 11). However, as discussed below, better management of the available resources 
cannot have the desired impact if unaccompanied by a commitment to de-link political 
struggles from the functioning of police agencies, particularly for those – as is the case for 
the BiH Border Police – that have the added dimension of strengthening the state-level 
structures.  
Concerns over sustainability have also been raised in the case of the Kosovo Border 
Police. For example, an assessment of the IT and communication systems showed that 
sustainability was problematic in this area (EULEX 2009, 80). More generally, the 
sustainability of an IBM strategy in Kosovo is affected by understaffed and under-
equipped border crossing points, limited intra and inter-agency cooperation and regional 
cooperation (EULEX 2009, 131; Forum for Security, 2010). For instance, it is estimated 
that the Kosovo Border Police needs an additional 1,000 border officers in order to meet 
the Schengen criteria (FRIDOM 2009, 17).  
Local ownership has been singled out as a key objective by the EULEX mission 
(EULEX 2009, 2010); however, it is still too early to ascertain how much the Mission has 
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contributed to achieving this goal. A serious concern, however, refers to the fact that the 
Mission still retains executive powers in some areas (Council of the EU 2008) and this 
could undermine efforts to promote local ownership (see Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 
2011, 432-437). For example, EULEX has maintained executive responsibilities in Gates 
1 and 31 in the north of Kosovo. Some observers have noted that despite the Mission’s 
rhetoric, ‘it is obvious that the EULEX leaders still keep a hand on the steering wheel and 
largely design the roadmap that must be followed – but that only partially reflects the 
actual situation of the country’ (Keukeleire et al 2011: 194). 
 
Contextual Conditions 
When analysing the contextual challenges on border management in the region one 
needs to go back to the local political and socio-economic realities mentioned earlier in 
the article. In the case of Bosnia, its border agency is weakened by the persistent 
politicisation of rule of law by local stakeholders. This improper use of politics led in 2005 
to a situation that for a moment made the fragility of the reforms carried out by the 
international community since the end of 1995 seemed more apparent. On 9 September 
2005, the High Representative at the time, Paddy Ashdown, appointed a number of 
individuals to senior positions in the BiH Border Police, including its Director and Deputy 
Director. The Bosnian Council of Ministers had repeatedly failed to appoint individuals, 
based on merit first and then ethnic representation, to these senior management positions. 
As a result, the BiH Border Police had been without a Director since February 2004 and 
effectively without any management since July 2005 (OHR Press Office 2005b). The 
impact that this crisis of leadership had on the effectiveness of the BiH Border Police was 
exacerbated by the August 2005 events that led to the killing of a Bosnia Muslim border 
officer by a Bosnian Serb colleague. This incident was described by some as an ethnic-
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based killing, particularly after allegations that the BiH Border Police’s authorities had in 
the past covered up other inter-ethnic conflicts between officers belonging to this agency. 
The Bosnian Ministry of Justice soon after refuted this claim. The Republika Srpska Prime 
Minister argued that such an incident would not have happened if the BiH Border Police 
was still under the jurisdiction of the Entities (OHR Press Office 2005a). These two events 
in 2005 illustrate the continuing power struggle between nationalist politicians and police 
structures that can provide Bosnia with a state ‘personality’ and whose appropriate 
functioning has become intrinsic to the country’s path towards EU and NATO integration. 
In this regard, the year 2005 was not the last time the BiH Border Police was affected by 
the country’s political situation. In 2009 Milorad Dodik, at the time Republika Srpska 
Prime Minister, attempted to return to the Entities up to 68 state competencies including 
customs and police (Alic 2009). And in June 2010, Raffi Gregorian, at the time Principle 
Deputy High Representative, stated, ‘it is hard for the Border Police to fulfil all its tasks 
when some political leaders question the legitimacy of state institutions and seek to cut 
[their] funding […] so they can raise spending in the entities” (OHR Press Office 2010).  
The dangers that the unsolved political situation in Bosnia can and have had on the 
functioning of the BiH Border Police would be, at least to some extent, disputed by those 
that consider the border police as administratively sustainable and with enough 
institutional identity to consolidate its development (personal interviews by author, 
Sarajevo, October-November 2006). Although one could mistakenly read too much into 
the specific events listed above, the challenge posed by those political authorities wanting 
to control – as much as possible – the BiH Border Police should not be underestimated. In 
the words of Kai Skogstrom (2006, 4), at the time EUPM Chief Advisor to the BiH Border 
Police, ‘the State Border Police’s structure […] continues to shield it from excessive local 
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political interference, although a level of interference still exists when speaking about 
upper management’.  
Kosovo’s border control has similarly been affected by contextual factors. Given the 
levels of organised crime and human trafficking in Kosovo, the effectiveness of the Border 
Police has been called into question on several occasions (see, for instance, Council of 
Europe 2007). The links between war criminals and members of the Kosovo Police are 
widely known. Economic underdevelopment and a political culture at odds with individual 
accountability have constituted a perfect breeding ground for corruption and organised 
crime (see ICG 2010, 11). As an illustration of this problem, Bolton (2005, 7) argued that 
the income of 50 per cent of the households in one municipality neighbouring the 
Administrative Boundary Line was supported by revenues from smuggling activities. 
However, despite assessments such as this one, one of the main problems has been the 
lack of reliable data and intelligence about illegal crossings and seizures, which makes it 
very difficult to assess accurately the impact of organised crime in Kosovo (EULEX 2009, 
53). Corruption cases have also affected the Kosovo Border Police. For instance, in 2009 
twelve border police officers were arrested for accepting bribes. According to the ICG, 
EULEX has recommended that ‘border police be barred from carrying mobile phones at 
work, to prevent them from coordinating with smugglers’ (ICG 2010, 11). The low 
salaries of border police officers have not helped in this regard. As mentioned by a 
Commission-funded report, ‘[t]he remuneration of the BBP [Border and Boundary Police] 
personnel remains modest, and they do not benefit from social or legal protection’ 
(Kosovo Donors Conference 2008, 5).  
The political uncertainty about the status of Kosovo has also undermined the 
effectiveness of the reform projects. Initially, it led to a complex border management 
system under UNMIK. Even though the UN introduced a single system of borders, two 
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different types of borders and, therefore, two different regimes could be distinguished: 
international borders with Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia/fYROM and the 
Administrative Boundary Line with Serbia. Besides, some international borders such as 
those with Montenegro have not been demarcated, not to mention that with Serbia (Forum 
for Security 2010, 4). When it comes to the implementation of IBM principles, the status 
of Kosovo has also had an impact. For instance, until recently, most of the green borders 
of Kosovo were patrolled by KFOR, against the EU’s principle of civilian border 
management.  
The limbo status in which Kosovo has lived for years also explains the lack of 
relevant legislation in the area of border control and management. A case in point here 
refers to the control of illegal immigration. It was only in July 2005 when a regulation on 
the matter came into force (Regulation 2005/16 on the Movement of Persons into and out 
of Kosovo). Travel documents, identity cards and driving licenses were issued by UNMIK 
and, even then, problems were encountered as the Serbian authorities refused to accept 
those documents as valid travel documents. After Kosovo’s independence, new Kosovo 
passports were introduced, but they are not accepted by those countries that have not 
recognised Kosovo’s independence. With the transition from UNMIK to EULEX more 
progress has been achieved. A law on integrated management and control of the state 
border was adopted in May 2008. Kosovo’s national IBM strategy which was adopted in 
December 2006 was revised in 2009 and an action plan to improve intra- and inter-agency 
coordination was adopted in April 2009.  
Yet, the politicisation of Kosovo’s borders has not ceased after the declaration of 
independence. If anything, it has worsened due to strained relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina and the non-recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, as well as other five EU member 
states.13 These problems delayed for a year the deployment of the EULEX mission until 
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December 2008. Opposition by Cyprus and Slovakia has also prevented cooperation 
between the Kosovo Border Police and FRONTEX (Forum for Security 2010, 6). 
Moreover, the fact that some EU member states do not recognize Kosovo also limits the 
instruments that the EU can bring forward to promote reforms in the country, in particular, 
the prospect of membership. However, in an effort to support the adoption of border 
management-related reforms, the Council stated that ‘Kosovo should also benefit from the 
perspective of eventual visa liberalisation, once all conditions are met’ [...] Without 
prejudice to Member States’ positions on status’ (Council of the EU 2009). Talks on visa 
liberalisation were launched in January 2012.  
One of the main areas of disagreement between Kosovo and Serbia refers to the 
control of the territory north of the Ibar River, largely populated by Serbs. Kosovo’s new 
independent institutions have been unable to exercise full control over the border in this 
area, which was the scene of violent acts in February 2008. According to an ICG report 
(2010), there were around 30 EULEX border police and another 20 custom officers at 
gates 1 and 31 in the border between Serbia and Kosovo, but the presence of local Kosovo 
Border Police officers was very small. Moreover, because of the political tensions, the 
EULEX role was limited, custom checks irregular and custom revenues were not 
collected. Attempts to reinforce the presence of the Kosovo Border Police in these 
checkpoints have led to more violent clashes between KFOR and Kosovo Serb protesters 
since July 2011. It is yet to see whether the EU-mediated talks between Kosovo and Serbia 
launched in 2011 might help tackle some of these border issues. So far, agreement has 
been reached to establish joint custom checkpoints in the north of Kosovo, as well as on 
issues related to car insurance and licence plates. Since December 2011, Serbia also allows 
Kosovo citizens to enter the country and move freely with documents issued at the border.  
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Conclusion 
Located in its Southern periphery, and as part of a process of harmonisation in JHA 
matters, the Western Balkan countries are expected to undergo a transformation of their 
border management systems in accordance with EU principles (i.e. those in the IBM 
Strategy). The objective is to build effective and secure borders. Effective so that borders 
do not disrupt free movement of people, goods and services. And secure to ensure that 
they can successfully deter security threats. This two-fold objective has guided much of 
the design and implementation of border management projects in the region. However, in 
various important respects the security-driven rationality of this strategy has predominated 
in line with the development of an ‘external shield’ (Monar 2007, 54) that protects the 
Union’s internal space from ‘unwanted’ threats.  
The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo’s border police agencies best exemplify the EU’s 
efforts in the area of border management. The process and results in these two cases have 
varied greatly. While the first one (Bosnia) – despite its many shortcomings – is said to 
possess an advanced border security system; progress in the case of Kosovo has for long 
remained hostage to the political uncertainty that surrounded its status. However, in both 
cases one can identify a number of shortcomings associated with the tensions arising from 
the three-fold contradiction inbuilt into the ‘security-first approach’ (Ryan 2009) of the 
Union’s border strategy, as outlined above. That is, shortcomings arising from tensions 
between short-term vs. long-term objectives; a security vs. development focus; and 
interventionism vs. local ownership approaches. These tensions shed light on the 
incompatibility at times – albeit not inevitable − of the Union’s two-fold objective of using 
its border strategy to ensure the long-term stabilisation of the region and, eventually, its 
integration into the EU, but also its own internal security needs, as illustrated in the article 
using coordination and effectiveness as assessment variables.  
Published in the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12(2), 2012, pp. 201-220. 
 
 29 
The coordination of activities within the EU family and with other international 
actors has not always run as smoothly as planned, particularly among civilian 
organisations. Problems of coherence have reflected different institutional approaches to 
border management, with the Commission favouring long-term and developmental 
activities and the Council preferring short-term measures with an emphasis on security. 
Although in some respects both types of activities fall short of promoting ‘local 
ownership’, the Commission’s approach could be said to have been less ‘interventionist’. 
At the same time, the effectiveness of EU border management reforms in the Western 
Balkans – particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo – has been affected by a variety of factors, 
ranging from the contradictory EU agenda guiding its operational efforts to ‘local realities’ 
shaped by the political and socio-economic situation on the ground.  
There are no two similar cases when it comes to assistance to border services or 
security sector reform more generally. However, at the same time, there is by now a wealth 
of ‘lessons-learnt’ in the region that one can borrow from. One can only expect that future 
EU activities will make good use of these learning experiences.    
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1
 This article draws from interviews conducted by the authors in Brussels and Bosnia between 2003 and 
2010. These interviews are part of their ongoing research into issues of security sector reform, statebuilding 
and the role of the EU in the Western Balkans.  
2
 For an illustration see Hills’ analysis (2006a) of the motivations driving the EU intervention in border 
management matters in Bosnia.  
3
 CARDS allocated a total of €107.20 million to the Western Balkan countries for the implementation of the 
IBM National Strategies.  
4
 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has also played a very important 
role in encouraging regional cooperation through its Border Security Programme’s annual ministerial 
conferences.  
5
 The Maastricht Treaty established three pillars: the first or communitarian pillar, mainly covering trade 
and internal economic activities; the second pillar involving foreign and security issues; and the third pillar 
for justice and home affairs. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) formally abolished the pillar division.  
6
 For a similar assessment of the EU’s assistance to the rule of law in Kosovo, see Keukeleire et al. 2011. 
The authors argue the EU’s ‘institution-building paradigm’ will not be successful unless its assistance is 
directed to improving key underlying factors such as income and education.   
7
 For the sake of clarity this article will use throughout the most current name, BiH Border Police.  
8
 The EU granted visa-free travel to citizens from Macedonia/fYROM, Serbia and Montenegro in 2009, 
followed in 2010 by Albania and Bosnia.  Talks on visa liberalisation with Kosovo were launched in January 
2012. Flessenkemper and Bütow point out that greater emphasis on solving the structural democratic and 
social deficits of the region came after visa-free travel had been granted (2011, 168).  
9
 In the case of Bosnia activities falling under the fourth ‘block’ have included the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the Roma population and strengthening the institution of the Ombudsman, among 
others (personal interview by author, Sarajevo, 16 September 2010). 
10
 Information available in EUPM’s website, http://www.eupm.org/Public%20Opinion%20Research.aspx 
(accessed on 14 April 2012).  
11
 The active role played by this country has inevitably led the BiH Border Police to develop operational 
practices very similar to the German ones. Not all international police experts in the field consider these 
practices as the most adequate for the Bosnian reality, leading some to suggest that with time this institution 
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would have to revise its working methods. By 2009 this was already happening (personal interviews by 
author, Sarajevo, 25 October 2006 and 15 September 2009).  
12
 Similar deficiencies were identified in the case of Kosovo (Kosovo Donors Conference 2008, 13-16).  
13
 As of April 2012, 22 Member States had recognised Kosovo’s independence. Romania, Spain, Greece, 
Slovakia and Cyprus have refused to do so. 
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